Ayatollah Khamenei is dead. Killed in the United States and Israel’s air assault on Iran. The exact reason for these strikes, and what strategic advantage gained by killing Khamenei, is unclear. Justifications have been offered by the aggressing parties, to be clear, but these justifications are so contrary to facts on the ground that they are hard to take seriously. The Trump administration has characterized this as a preemptive action taken to eliminate an imminent threat to the people of the United States. How imminent? Well... they won’t say. The Trump administration also claims that this is an effort to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, something that he claimed he had accomplished just last year. Now that the bombs are flying, Trump himself has called for regime change; telling the Iranian people that “this will probably be your only chance in generations.”
The fact that the United States desires regime change in Iran is in no way remarkable. Pursuing regime change in Iran has been an active, and sometimes successful, effort since Mossadegh nationalized the country’s oil in 1953. What is remarkable is that nothing the United States has done during this newly declared war resembles a coherent regime change strategy.
Let's imagine a scenario. A dictatorship has taken hold in the United States. The President is not widely popular but popular enough to withstand mass protests against his archaic policies. The military is a fractured mess with a special arm, created to be the President’s most staunch agents of violent influence, regularly dispatched to terrorize particularly problematic dissident movements.
One random day, Russia and China bomb the White House, Congress, the homes of key loyalists to the President, and military infrastructure. No boots are on the ground, but President Xi Jinping releases an ominous statement on Weibo calling for the people of the United States to “seize their destiny.” Do these actions help or hinder the dissidents of the country? Do these actions result in the collapse of the United States government? I would have to answer “hinder,” and “no.”
The most likely scenario, I would think, would be civil war. With pro-regime forces using the bombing as a prime example that the dissidents have sold out to foreign agents in the name of power.
Of course, what the people really want is inconsequential to the bombing powers. The people are props. Convenient excuses to strike at an old, enduring, enemy. The desire for regime change is genuine. Occupying such a large landmass as the United States, or Iran, is not exactly feasible for anyone. But, as we have established, one cannot change a regime by simply bombing it. Boots on the ground are necessary. Whose boots? Anybody’s really, but ideally not yours. Make no mistake though, boots on the ground can be just as unproductive as no boots on the ground.
Determining the feasibility of a regime change operation is a complex endeavor; so complex that even I cannot appreciate all the variables that go into it (I am just a lowly college graduate with a poli-sci degree). However, the history of regime change operations — within this century alone — can provide enough information to arrive at some sort of understanding of what it takes.
Some Historical Context
Let us look at the most recent “regime change” operation conducted by the USA: Venezuela. Just this year, we captured the dictator of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro. A very literal diplomatic coup. Ending Maduro’s dictatorship and establishing a pro-US regime in Caracas has been a long-standing goal for us. Our diplomatic support for the democratic opposition within the country has been steadfast. The leader of this opposition had just won the Nobel Peace prize — and called for Trump to overthrow the Maduro regime as she did — and her party is almost certainly the legitimate winner of the most recent Venezuelan elections. When we captured Maduro, did they spring into action to establish a democratic government? No. President Trump made deals with what remained of Maduro’s regime. Now Venezuela is stuck with Maduro’s state apparatus, helmed by not Maduro.
In 2021, the United States pulled out of Afghanistan completely. Before we had managed to pull all of our forces out, the Taliban had seized control of the state once again. When we first invaded Afghanistan in 2001 it took all of a few weeks to topple the Taliban state. We spent 2 decades building a new state apparatus in its place. What happened? We won every battle against the Taliban. We had boots on the ground for 20 years. We had constructed a native army, state, and police apparatus. How could the Taliban have taken it all in just a few days? Simply put, all these institutions we built were reliant on our presence. The people did not feel any sort of loyalty to this new state. When we gave up on it, so did Afghanistan.
In 2011, Libya was gripped by a civil war. The dictator Muammar Gaddafi was fending off rebel groups, committing more and more horrific acts of violence in order to maintain his power. The US joined Britain and France to conduct an air bombing campaign against Gaddafi’s forces. This assistance allowed the rebels to reach Gaddafi himself, and kill him. Gaddafi had made himself the state of Libya. Without him the whole thing ceased to exist. We had made no plan to deal with the day after Gaddafi was gone. The result? A brutal civil war that lasts to this day. Libya became a failed state.
When we toppled Saddam’s regime in Iraq, we dissolved his political party and the Iraqi military. In doing this, we deprived any and all members of the former state any sort of political representation. More importantly we had completely destroyed the Iraqi state as it had existed up to that point. Any institutional legitimacy that may have still existed evaporated in an instant. The former military apparatus formed an insurgency that would go on to become ISIS, plunging Iraq and Syria into a decade of violence. Today Iraq is a semi-democracy dominated by pro-Iran militias, not exactly the kind of regime we had in mind when we first invaded.
Clearly, regime change is difficult. Not that it is hard to get rid of a regime. That part is easy. Figuring out how to replace the regime is the hard part. It is quite clearly easy to get wrong. This is not a novel observation. In fact, based on polling, most Americans understand this. So let's simplify.
Frequent Mistakes of Regime Change Operations:
- Misunderstanding of local political dynamics.
- Misunderstanding of political institutions in the country
- Failure to commit
- Failure to secure commitment from the population
- Failure to visualize the future regime
Now The Strange Case of Iran
There is no easy or simple way to speak of Iranian state institutions. The Islamic Republic might as well be alien to most Americans. Even the act of calling it “The Islamic Republic” may take an American by surprise. The average American views Iran as an enemy, ruled by a dictator known as “the Ayatollah.” Is this view incorrect? No, not really. Is it so simplified that it doesn’t offer any true hint of understanding? Emphatically, yes.
Let's talk about regime types. We can divide our previously mentioned cases into two different types of regimes: Personalist and Institutional.
A personalist regime is one where the Supreme Leader/Dictator functionally is the state. No state apparatus exists beyond his gaze and reach. The state exists to serve his ends. Saddam’s Iraq is such a regime, as was Gaddafi’s Libya, as was Hitler’s Germany.
An institutional regime has, you guessed it, institutions which make up the state. Such regimes still can be, and are, dominated by individuals but are not tied up into that individual. The state needs the office more than it needs the individual who occupies the office. Look towards Afghanistan, Syria, Venezuela, Mussolini’s Italy.
In the case of Iran, there are strong and longstanding institutional structures which exist to maintain theocratic rule.
The most important structure is that of a succession. Upon the death or incapacitation of the Supreme Leader a council is formed by the President, the Head of the Judiciary, and a senior cleric selected by the Expediency Council. These figures lead the state in lieu of a Supreme Leader until The Assembly of Experts selects a new one. These processes were initiated following the assassination of Khamenei. Deliberation is ongoing, with the IRGC backing Khamenei’s son Mojtaba. Speaking of the IRGC...
The second most important structure for securing the Islamic Republic is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).These are not the armed forces of Iran but they are a branch of the armed forces. The IRGC is the most hardline military faction in the country, filled with zealot defenders of the Islamic Republic. Created to be a counterweight to any anti-regime sentiment that might arise within the traditional army. The IRGC, in short, exists to prevent a coup by a more moderate faction favored by the army.
Another military group within Iran is the Basij paramilitaries, who function similarly to the IRGC, and frequently work with the IRGC. The Basij functions as an internal occupation force. Monitoring neighborhoods and communities, cracking down on internal dissent.
This is not a system you can simply bomb out of existence.
To see this, one simply needs to look at what has happened since Khamenei’s death. Iran’s military responded by lobbing missiles and bombs at Israel, and US military bases. In this capacity Iran shows a willingness to do this for as long as they need to. Iran’s institutions have selected a new Supreme Leader who is unlikely to negotiate a peace deal. We have, after all, killed his parents and his wife (and tried to kill him). Israel attempted to stop his selection by bombing the building the Assembly of Experts typically meets in.
No domestic rival faction has stepped up to challenge the existing state. There are reports now that the Kurds in the western frontiers of Iran may now be preparing to fight, but they are a minority and are unlikely to have much success on their own.
If the Trump administration thought that this operation would be as simple as bombing Khamenei and declaring victory, they are sorely mistaken. They have misjudged the local political dynamics. They have failed completely to understand the institutions that have held the Islamic Republic together up to this point. There is no sign that they are willing to commit to necessary actions that would produce a change in regime. There does not appear to be a tangible commitment from the population to do the heavy lifting for us. Trump himself cannot articulate who should rule in Iran. Producing what can only be described as an unmitigated disaster.
The Iranian regime now engages in what it deems to be an existential struggle to preserve itself. It has lashed out at every country in the region that contains US bases. Its threats have effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, a move that could produce an energy crisis any day now. There is no incentive for the Iranian government to back down until they are sure they have given Washington and Tel Aviv a massive bloody nose.
There are only two options for the United States now. Back off or commit to a years long quagmire. Go back to our imagined scenario where the shoe is on the other foot. China and Russia have bombed the US government. The regime appears to still be standing. What would you advise them to do?